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as theirs were either very good at switching or maintaining 
perspective versus no information. Our results show that 
highs, but neither lows nor mediums, were strongly influ-
enced by the given information. However, highs were not 
better at maintaining the same perspective than participants 
with lower hypnotisability. Taken together, these find-
ings favour the view that the higher sensitivity of highs in 
comparison to lows to the bistability of ambiguous figures 
reflect the implementation of different strategies.
Introduction
Within the field of hypnosis, it is widely acknowledged that 
people are not equally responsive to hypnotic suggestions 
(suggestions for altered experiences of reality or volition) 
(Heap, Brown, & Oakley 2004; Hilgard 1965; Kallio & 
Ihamuotila 1999; Laurence, Beaulieu-Prévost, & Du Chéné 
2008; Perry, Nadon, & Button 1992; Shor & Orne 1962; 
Weitzenhoffer & Hilgard 1962; but see; Barber 1969; Spa-
nos 1986). Although it is largely believed by researchers 
that differences in hypnotisability must be reflected in par-
ticipants’ other traits (i.e., from outside the hypnotic con-
text), attempts to determine potential different cognitive 
profiles between highs and lows rarely find replicated cor-
relates that predict with better than r = 0.2, when tested in 
unrelated contexts (Council, Kirsch, & Hafner 1986; Heap, 
Brown, & Oakley 2004; Laurence, Beaulieu-Prévost, & Du 
Chéné 2008). In addition, there is no firm genetic, physi-
ological, behavioural or phenomenological marker differ-
entiating highs from lows. In sum, why some people are 
more responsive to hypnotic suggestions than others is still 
an unresolved issue.
One of the more promising avenues of research has 
been the hypothesis that highs exhibit more efficient 
Abstract Previous research has suggested that highly 
hypnotisable participants (‘highs’) are more sensitive to the 
bistability of ambiguous figures—as evidenced by report-
ing more perspective changes of a Necker cube—than low 
hypnotisable participants (‘lows’). This finding has been 
interpreted as supporting the hypothesis that highs have 
more efficient sustained attentional abilities than lows. 
However, the higher report of perspective changes in highs 
in comparison to lows may reflect the implementation of 
different expectation-based strategies as a result of differ-
ently constructed demand characteristics according to one’s 
level of hypnotisability. Highs, but not lows, might interpret 
an instruction to report perspective changes as an instruc-
tion to report many changes. Using a Necker cube as our 
bistable stimulus, we manipulated demand characteristics 
by giving specific information to participants of different 
hypnotisability levels. Participants were told that previous 
research has shown that people with similar hypnotisability 
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executive control than lows, evidenced by greater sus-
tained and selective attentional abilities (Crawford 1991, 
1994; Crawford, Brown, & Moon 1993; for a recent 
review about the role of frontal executive functions in 
hypnosis, see; Parris in press). However, results for dif-
ferent baseline performances—from outside  the hyp-
notic context—according to participants’ hypnotisability 
level in various executive and attentional dimensions are 
mixed, with studies reporting no significant behavioural 
differences (Cojan, Piguet, & Vuilleumier 2015; Dienes 
et  al. 2009; Egner, Jamieson, & Gruzelier 2005; Iani, 
Ricci, Gherri, & Rubichi 2006; Iani, Ricci, Baroni, & 
Rubichi 2009; Raz, Fan, & Posner 2005; Varga, Németh, 
& Szekely 2011) but, importantly, other studies show-
ing significant differences in either direction (Crawford 
et  al. 1993; Dixon, Brunet, & Laurence 1990; Dixon & 
Laurence 1992; Farvolden & Woody 2004; Miller, Hen-
nessy, & Leibowitz 1973; Miller 1975; Rubichi, Ricci, 
Padovani, & Scaglietti 2005; Wallace 1986; Wallace & 
Garrett 1973; Wallace, Garrett, & Anstadt 1974; Wallace, 
Knight, & Garrett 1976). Recently, a new layer of com-
plexity has been added to this already tangled issue, as it 
has been shown (Cojan et al. 2015; Lifshitz & Raz 2015) 
that similar behavioural levels of Stroop or Stroop-like 
interference between highs and lows were accompanied 
by different patterns of neural activity. Highs and lows 
may have different cognitive styles or different context-
dependent strategies.
Potential attentional differences between highs and lows 
have been investigated by means of different experimen-
tal procedures, especially by means of conflicting (e.g., 
Stroop), distracting or priming paradigms (Cojan, Piguet, & 
Vuilleumier 2015; Dienes et al. 2009; Iani et al. 2009; Raz 
et al. 2005; Varga et al. 2011) and, finally, by means of spe-
cific visual illusions. Some evidence suggest that highs and 
mediums are more sensitive than lows to the Ponzo illusion, 
that highs report more changes in direction of autokinetic 
movement (illusory movement of a light in a dark room) 
and more reversals of a Necker cube than lows (Crawford 
et al. 1993; Miller et al. 1973; Miller 1975; Wallace & Gar-
rett 1973; Wallace et al. 1974, 1976; Wallace 1986; but see; 
Jamieson & Sheehan 2002). Previous research advocated 
that responsiveness to bistable figures depends on focusing 
attention towards the relevant and salient cues while filter-
ing (disattending) irrelevant cues (Power & Day 1973). In 
this regard, Crawford and colleagues (1993) interpret the 
higher sensitivity of highs in comparison to lows to bistable 
figures and visual illusions as reflecting different attentional 
abilities; with highs showing more efficient sustained atten-
tional and disattentional abilities than lows. In other words, 
highs may report a higher rate of perspective switches in a 
Necker cube because of a higher ability to focus on the sali-
ent cues and to disattend the non-salient ones.
However, the higher sensitivity of highs to bistable 
figures or visual illusions might reflect expectation-based 
strategy differences rather than baseline attentional dif-
ferences (Dienes et al. 2009). We have to know what par-
ticipants are trying to achieve during the task otherwise 
results are difficult to interpret. If the instruction consists 
in asking participants to report every perspective change, 
as was the case in previous studies comparing highs and 
lows on the perception of bistable figures (Crawford et al. 
1993; Wallace 1986; Wallace et  al. 1976), the higher 
rate of switches by highs might reflect the implementa-
tion of specific strategies in order to fulfil what they 
thought to be a “good high” in this context (Orne 1959, 
1969; Spanos 1986; for recent instances of the effect of 
demand characteristics in different perceptual phenom-
ena and new methods to unveil them, see; Firestone 2013; 
Firestone & Scholl 2014; Martin, Sackur, Anlló, Naish, 
& Dienes 2016). That is, they might have inferred that 
the experimenter expected them to see many perspective 
switches, while lows are simply neutral about the kind 
of switch rate expected by the experimenter. To be clear, 
we are not arguing that highs may be better than lows or 
mediums in interpreting demand characteristics, but that 
different demand characteristics are inferred given one’s 
level of hypnotic suggestibility. In addition, or alterna-
tively, it might also be argued that lows might have been 
less motivated than highs in doing the task, reporting less 
switches than highs.
Here, we shall assay the weight of demand characteris-
tics in behaviours that have been attributed to differential 
attentional abilities across hynotisability levels. Namely, 
we tested whether when asked to report perceptual 
switches of a bistable figure, participants would differ-
entially adapt their performance to specific information 
according to their level of hypnotisability.
We tested this hypothesis using a Necker cube as the 
bistable stimulus. Using a design close to the one of 
Crawford et al. (1993), we tested three groups of partici-
pants; highs, mediums and lows, thus spanning the whole 
spectrum of hypnotisability levels. Participants had to 
report every perspective change of a Necker cube. In the 
first block—Neutral Block—of trials, no specific infor-
mation was given to participants. In the second block—
Test Block—, participants were either informed that pre-
vious research had demonstrated that people with their 
specific level of hypnotisability had been shown to be 
able to change perspective easily (Switch Condition) or 
to maintain the same perspective easily (Maintain Condi-
tion) and that we would like to test this hypothesis with 
a Necker cube. Our inclusion of the group of mediums 
enables us to test whether any difference in the rate of 






Participants who took part in this experiment had been 
screened for hypnotisability with the French version of the 
Harvard Group Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility, Form A 
(Shor & Orne 1962; Anlló, Becchio & Sackur 2017). This 
scale consists in a relaxation-based induction phase fol-
lowed by 12 suggestions, encompassing cognitive sugges-
tions (e.g., hallucination), motor suggestions (e.g. hands 
moving together) and challenge suggestions (to not succeed 
at an action e.g. to not be able to bend the arm because of 
arm rigidity). Subjects’ score is determined by the number 
of suggestions they pass according to specific criteria. As 
an illustration, the magnetic hands suggestion is phrased as 
followed:
“Now I want you to imagine a force attracting your 
hands toward each other, pulling them together. As 
you think of this force pulling your hands together, 
they will move together, slowly at first, but they will 
move closer together, closer and closer together as 
though a force were acting them… moving… mov-
ing… closer… closer….” (Shor & Orne 1962, p. 9).
We recruited 21 highly hypnotisable participants (highs) 
scoring 9–12 (M = 9.6, SD 0.8; 12 females; mean age 24.3, 
SD 3.6), 24 moderately hypnotisable participants (medi-
ums) scoring 5–8 (M = 6.2, SD 1.2; 18 females; mean age 
25.3, SD 4.3) and 23 low hypnotisable participants (lows) 
scoring 0–4 (M = 2.6, SD 1.2; 12 females; mean age 25.6, 
SD 4.5). Each subject was paid 5  € for participation, the 
whole experiment lasting approximately 30  min. Partici-
pants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Written informed consent was obtained from each par-
ticipant and the experiment was conducted in agreement 
with the Declaration of Helsinki (2008) and approved by 
the Ethics Committee of the Université Paris Descartes 
(Paris 5).
Experimental setup and apparatus
The experiment was conducted in a quiet experimental 
room. Stimuli were delivered by a MacBook Pro, processor 
2.53 GHz, Intel Core i5. All stimuli were displayed using 
Matlab (MathWorks Inc R 2009b) with the Psychophysics 
Toolbox (Brainard 1997).
Stimuli and experimental design
Participants were seated at about 60 cm from the screen. 
A Necker cube (edge size 1.7  cm/~1.6°) was displayed 
against a light-grey background at the centre of the screen 
during periods of 60 s. During these periods, participants 
had to report each time they saw a change in cube per-
spective by means of key presses. As training, before 
the first period, participants were shown the ambigu-
ous Necker cube accompagnied by two non-ambiguous 
cubes, illustrating the two possible interpretations of the 
ambiguous cube (see Fig. 1). Participants were asked to 
tell the experimenter once they observed that the ambigu-
ous cube could indeed switch back and forth between 
the two perspectives represented by the non-ambiguous 
cubes.
The experiment comprised two blocks composed of 
five 60  s periods each. There was a short break of 5  s 
between each consecutive 60  s period. The first block 
(Neutral Block) was presented to participants as a train-
ing block. Instructions were as close as possible to Craw-
ford et al. (1993):
Training
The cube will be displayed for 60  s at a time. Press the 
key with an upwards arrow drawn on it [corresponding 
to the j key] when you see the cube changing direction 
upwards, press the key with a downwards arrow drawn 
on it [corresponding to the f key] when you see the cube 
changing direction downwards. When you are looking at 
the cube, look at it as you normally would. Do not blink 
excessively [Translated from the French version given to 
participants].
The second block (Test Block), presented as the 
test block to participants, was preceded by specific 
Fig. 1  Stimulus and procedure. In the instruction phase participants 
were shown the ambiguous cube (left cube) accompanied by two non-
ambiguous cubes (right bold cubes) showing the two possible alter-
natives the ambiguous cube could alternate between. Participants 
were described the perspective shown by the bold cube on the top 
as the upwards perspective and the bold cube on the bottom as the 
downwards perspective. Participants were instructed to press the key 
with an upwards arrow drawn on it (j key) when the cube switched 
from the downwards to the upwards perspective and the key with a 
downwards arrow drawn on it (f key) when the cube switched from 
the upwards to the downwards perspective
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information. According to the condition participants were 
(randomly) assigned to—Switch Condition (SC) or Main-
tain Condition (MC)—the information specified that pre-
vious research had shown that they were able to shift per-
spective easily or to maintain the same perspective easily, 
respectively:
Second phase
We know that people like you with high (for mediums: 
some) hypnotic abilities (for lows: that are resistant to hyp-
nosis) have a great ability to change (in the SC) (to main-
tain the same, in the MC) perspective. We would like to 
test this hypothesis with the cube. As before, when you are 
looking at the cube, look at it as you normally would. Do 
not blink excessively [Translated from the French version 
given to participants].
Because the nature of the information given to partici-
pants depended on their hypnotisability level, at the very 
beginning of the experiment (i.e., before Neutral Block and 
its instruction phase) participants were reminded what their 
level of hypnotisability was:
We recruited you for this experiment because you have 
shown high (for mediums: some) hypnotic abilities (for 
lows: showed resistance to hypnosis) during screening 
[Translated from the French version given to participants].
Results
Two participants were excluded because debriefing showed 
that they did not understand the task. One participant was 
excluded because 64% of her/his key presses were identical 
key responses, suggesting again a misunderstanding about 
the task. In total, we thus rejected two participants from the 
group of highs and one from the group of lows. Episodes 
separated by repeated key presses were then conjoined. 
Next, we rejected as outliers episodes shorter than 600 ms 
(1.8%) and more than three standard deviations above each 
participant median duration (2.2%).
Mean frequency of perspective switches according 
to groups and conditions
Figure  2 shows the mean frequency of perspective 
switches according to groups and conditions. Mean num-
ber of switches per minute was numerically higher in highs 
(M = 21, SE = 2.2) than in lows (M = 15, SE = 1.3) and 
mediums (M = 14.2, SE = 1.1) in the Neutral Block. As 
for Test Block, in the Switch Condition, highs (M = 24.2, 
SE = 3.6) switched numerically more than lows (M = 16.5, 
SE = 1.7) and mediums (M = 16.6, SE = 1.1). Finally, in the 
Maintain Condition, while every group seemed to switch 
less than in the Switch Condition, no group markedly dif-
ferentiated from one another as shown by their mean fre-
quency of switches; highs (M = 11.8, SE = 2.9), lows 
(M = 13.6, SE = 2.5), mediums (M = 12.3, SE = 1.3).
Bayes factors
In order to evaluate the strength of evidence for the alterna-
tive hypotheses H1 versus H0 (Morey, Romeijn, & Rouder 
2016), we report Bayes Factors, B, for the relevant tests 
with one degree of freedom. Following Jeffrey (1939), we 
consider that a B above 3 indicates “substantial evidence” 
for H1 over H0 and, by symmetry, a B below 1/3 indicates 
substantial evidence for H0 over H1 (substantial only in 
the sense that the given evidence is just worth consider-
ing, Lee & Wagenmakers 2014). Therefore, a B between 
1/3 and 3 indicates data insensitivity: H1 and H0 cannot be 
distinguished.
Below we test differences in the mean frequency of per-
spective switches according to groups and conditions by 
means of Poisson regressions on the raw count of switches 
per minute. To know the relative evidence for H1 versus 
H0, the predictions of H1 need to be specified. Crawford 
et  al. (1993) found a mean difference of 6.06 switches 
per minute between highs and lows. Based on this, we 
can speculate that mediums should show a higher rate of 
perspective changes than lows, up to a maximum of 6. In 
order to have the same units between Crawford et al. 1993’s 
size effect and the coefficients of Poisson regressions, 
we took the log of the ratio between lows’ and mediums’ 
mean switch rate in Crawford et al. 1993’s, giving a value 
of 0.39. Then we modelled the alternative hypothesis H1 
with a uniform distribution referred to as: BU[0, 0.39] (Dienes 
2014, 2015). In addition, regarding the potential differences 
in mean switch rate between highs and the other groups we 
Fig. 2  Mean frequency of perspective changes. Graph shows the 
mean frequency of switches per minute for Neutral and Test Block, 
for every group (lows, mediums and highs) and, finally, for the Switch 
(dashed line) and Maintain (continuous line) condition
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might find, we modelled H1 with a half-normal distribu-
tion, written: BH(0, 0.39).
Regression
First, there was evidence in favour of H0 over the H1 
for the difference between lows and mediums in Neu-
tral Block (ß = 0.0280, SE = 0.0649, z = 0.43, p = 0.666, 
BU[0, 0.39] = 0.15) as well as in Test Block in the Main-
tain (ß = 0.0254, SE = 0.0959, z = 0.265, p = 0.791, 
BU[0, 0.39] = 0.25) and Switch (ß = −0.0195, SE = 0.0624, 
z = −0.31, p = 0.755, BU[0, 0.39] = 0.26) condition. That 
is, these groups did not differ in their mean switch rate. 
Accordingly, in all the following analyses, we considered 
a factor group with two levels: highs on the one hand and 
lows + mediums on the other.
Then, we ran the Poisson regression with factors of 
block (neutral/test), instruction (switch/maintain) and 
group (lows + mediums versus highs), see Table  1 for 
results of the triple interaction. There was evidence for 
the three-way interaction (ß = 0.052, SE = 0.0107, z = 4.87, 
p = 1.10 × 10−06, BH(0, 0.39) = 7966.90). We thus analysed 
the instruction by group two-way interactions within 
each block. For the Neutral Block, there was evidence 
for no instruction by group interaction (ß = −0.0134, 
SE  =  0.0589, z = −0.23, p > 0.819, BH(0, 0.39) = 0.18). In 
Test Block, there was marginal evidence for the two-way 
interaction (ß = −0.125, SE = 0.0581, z = −2.15, p < 0.0312, 
BH(0, 0.39) = 2.77), to the effect that highs responded more 
to the instructions (delta switch rate = 12.4) than lows and 
mediums (delta = 3.61).
In addition, to test whether we replicated Crawford et al. 
(1993)’s results we tested the differences between groups in 
Neutral Block. Replicating Crawford et  al. (1993)’s, there 
was indeed evidence for an effect of group (ß = −0.179, 
SE = 0.0589, z = −3.05, p < 0.005, BH(0, 0.39) = 27.15), such 
that highs had a higher switch rate than lows and mediums. 
For comparison, we also compared groups in Test Block. In 
the Switch Condition, highs had a higher switch rate than 
lows + mediums (ß = 0.17, SE  =  0.063, z = 2.68, p < 0.01, 
BH(0, 0.39) = 11.00), while in the Maintain Condition, highs 
switched to the same extent as lows + mediums (11.8 and 
12.9, respectively) (ß = −0.086, SE = 0.11, z = −0.81, 
p > 0.4, BH(0, 0.39) = 0.16).
Discussion
When no specific information is given to participants (Neu-
tral Block), highs in comparison to lows and mediums show 
a higher rate of perspective changes with a Necker cube. 
In this respect, our results are in keeping with previous 
research having shown the same superiority effect of highs 
in comparison to lows when tested with a Necker cube or 
other bistable percepts (Crawford et  al. 1993; Wallace 
1986; Wallace & Garrett 1973; Wallace, Knight, & Gar-
rett 1976; but see; Jamieson & Sheehan 2002). However, 
when specific information about their ability is provided to 
participants, highs in comparison to lows or mediums are 
much more affected by this specific information as shown 
by the triple interaction block by group by instruction.
Our results provide an alternative interpretation to 
the attentional account of groups switch rate differences 
(Crawford et al. 1993), that is in terms of behavioural strat-
egy differences (Spanos 1986; cf Sheehan, Donovan, & 
Macleod 1988). We can speculate that highs reported more 
perspective changes in Neutral Block (and in previous stud-
ies reporting such effect) because they thought that this was 
the behaviour expected from them. Because they know they 
are highs and that the instruction was (both in our study 
and previous ones) to report the number of perspective 
changes, they might have inferred that they have to report 
a lot of changes and adopted strategies to fit their expecta-
tions. Therefore, changing their expectations would change 
their performances more than lows and mediums.
If our interpretation is correct, this means that highs 
interpreted the information given before Test Block 
(switch or maintain information) in a different way than 
lows and mediums did. While highs took the information 
at face value, and were motivated to respond to it, lows 
Table 1  Regression results
Table shows results of the triple interaction for the Poisson regression
Beta (ß) Standard error z p value
Intercept 2.736 0.0539 50.69 2.00 × 10−16
Block 0.0516 0.0107 4.81 1.49 × 10−6
Instruction (switch/maintain) 0.140 0.0539 2.60 0.00927
Group −0.117 0.0539 −2.18 0.0292
Block × instruction −0.109 0.0107 −10.20 2.00 × 10−16
Block × group −0.0540 0.0107 −5.03 4.81 × 10−7
Instruction × group −0.0611 0.0538 −1.13 0.257
Block × group × instruction 0.0522 0.0107 4.87 1.10 × 10−6
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and mediums may have been less motivated. As a result, 
highs performed in Test Block as informed so that their 
performance deviated from neutral block as a function 
of the informational content of the condition they were 
assigned to (especially in the Maintain Condition). (As for 
the Switch Condition, highs may have reached ceiling in 
Neutral Block, preventing them to switch still more in Test 
Block). By contrast, the performance of lows and mediums 
was unchanged by the information given to them.
Another question that follow-up studies should address 
is whether highs adopted specific perceptual strategies in 
order to fit the content of the before-test-block information 
or simply increased (in the Switch Condition) and reduced 
(in the Maintain Condition) the rate of their response (com-
pliance). The literature suggests that highs usually do their 
best to experience the content of suggestions delivered to 
them (e.g. Cojan, Waber, Schwartz, Rossier, Forster, & 
Vuilleumier 2009; Derbyshire, Whalley, & Oakley 2009; 
Kirsch, Silva, Carone, Johnston, & Simon 1989). The cog-
nitive strategies that could maintain or switch a perspective 
include regulating attention to certain features to control 
bottom-up input (consider for example the longer switch 
times of meditators rather than non-meditators asked to 
maintain the perspective, Sauer, Lemke, Wittmann, Kohls, 
Mochty, & Walach 2012). Whether or not highs are bet-
ter or worse at this is an open question, not settled by the 
greater switching of highs rather than lows in Neutral 
Block; our results motivate the claim that is a matter of 
strategy choice rather than ability.
The present results need to be tested for generalisabil-
ity to differences between highs and lows in the context of 
other illusions. For example, highs in comparison to lows 
reported more changes in direction of autokinetic move-
ment (Crawford et al. 1993; Wallace & Garrett 1973). As 
our results suggest, it might be that highs inferred that it 
was expected from them to perceive a lot of movements 
and so they used different strategies from lows to fit their 
experience to that implied by demand characteristics. The 
same explanation might be given to account for the higher 
frequency of apparent reversals in highs than in lows for 
rotary illusions (Wallace et al. 1976) or for the higher sen-
sitivity of mediums and highs in comparison to lows to the 
Ponzo illusion (Miller 1975).
The results do not constitute a definitive argument 
against an account in terms of attentional abilities because 
the information we gave to participants before the test block 
was not explicit instructions to switch or maintain perspec-
tive. Therefore, we cannot fully exclude the possibility that 
highs (and lows and mediums for that matter) did not per-
form the best they could have been able to do. However, an 
alternative interpretation in terms of the implementation of 
different behavioural strategies between these populations 
remains a simple one. We showed that information about 
trait differences between highs and lows changed especially 
the behaviour of highs without us having to instruct them 
directly. Future studies with direct instructions for main-
taining or switching perspective with motivation ratings 
will be necessary to favour one over another account.
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